University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1982

Rulemaking as Politics
Antonin Scalia

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Antonin Scalia, "Rulemaking as Politics," 34 Administrative Law Review [xxv] (1982).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHAIRMAN'S
MESSAGE

Rulemaking as Politics

This is the last occasion on which, as Chairman of the Section, I will be provided this
free space to hold forth upon subjects of my
concern. I seize the opportunity to discuss a
topic no less cosmic (given the regrettably limited cosmos of administrative procedure) than
the relationship between rulemaking and
democracy. It is a topic of some current relevance because, unless I miss my guess, we have
entered a period in which the relationship will
be probed and tested, if not precisely defined.
ANTONIN SCALIA
We can launch our inquiry from the certitude of one well established principle, echoed in case after case down
through the years: Rulemaking is a quasi-legislative activity. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear what that means. In the words of Mr. Justice
Jackson, which are as true (and as elegant) today as when he wrote
them thirty years ago:
Administrative agencies have been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive
or quasi-judicial, as the occasion required, in order to validate their functions within the separation-of-powers scheme of the Constitution. The mere
retreat to the qualifying "quasi" is implicit with confession that all recognized
classifications have broken down, and "quasi" is a smooth cover which we
draw over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a
disordered bed. Jackson, J. dissenting, in FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 370,
487-88 (1952).
But whatever we mean by "quasi-legislative" in applying that term to
rulemaking, it surely implies some element of what might be termed

political discretion, not reviewable by the courts.
Let me state starkly what I think that means: An agency may make
some decisions in rulemaking not because they are the best or the most
intelligent, but because they are what the people seem to want. If I had
to give you a quotation from a case to support that principle, I would
frankly be at a loss to do so. But it has worked that way-and a good
thing, too, unless you are comfortable with the notion that the many
agencies charged with pursuing goals no more specific than "the public
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interest, convenience and necessity" are to do so in some isolated
think-tank, without regard to what the public wants. When I say "what
the public wants" I refer not to the latest Gallup poll, but to the
manifestations of the popular will through the political process-the
administration placed in office in the last election, the oversight and
appropriations committees of Congress, the groups with political
power (from Common Cause to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) that
appear before the agency and are listened to more closely than John
Doe precisely because of their political power.
As I have said, this intrusion of politics into the rulemaking process is
not to be found in the cases. The reason is that a number of jurisprudential devices have enabled it to have free play off the judicial
stage. In recent years, however, the situation has changed. Several of
the protective doctrines are now virtually defunct, and the rest are
either enfeebled or else not readily applicable to new rulemaking
initiatives. Moreover, the agencies' internal ability to recognize and
accommodate political factors has been impaired.
Ripeness and Standing. As recently as two decades ago, much of the
agencies' ability to operate as part of the political process was attributable to the doctrines of ripeness and standing. These enabled many
rules to be issued with the practical assurance that they would never be
subject to the rational, nonpolitical scrutiny of the courts. In the bad
old days, when a rule was not considered "ripe" for review until
enforcement was sought or threatened against a particular company,
the individual or company aggrieved by a "political" determination
would have to risk a penalty (by failing to comply with the rule) in order
to get to court-and that was often not worth it.
But the doctrine of ripeness had no special utility for politically based
judgments; it kept them out of court along with everything else. The
doctrine of standing, on the other hand, was almost tailor-made to
protect political discretion. It is rudimentary political science that slight
harm, expense or inconvenience imposed upon a large, diffuse body of
the population will generally not arouse effective political opposition.
But diffuseness, expansiveness, lack of particularity was what the doctrine of standing was all about. In other words, it excluded from the
courts precisely those interests that were likely to lose in a rulemaking
proceeding with substantial political content-the potential hikers and
campers who would be harmed by construction of a new ski-resort, to
take a real-life example. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
Insofar as federal rulemaking is concerned, legislative and judicial
developments have rendered the doctrines of ripeness and standing
insignificant obstacles tojudicial review. See, e.g., United States v. Students
ChallengingRegulatoryAgency Procedures(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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Rulemaking Discretion. I use this phrase in a newly coined, technical
sense, signifying the rulemaking equivalent of prosecutorial discretion. The latter doctrine teaches that the Federal Trade Commission,
for example, may choose not to proceed against a particular malefactor
and no court (generally speaking) will say that it must. Moreover, if it
chooses to proceed, no court will dismiss the enforcement action on the
ground that there are many more important enforcement actions on
which the agency should be spending its time. A similar principle
applies in rulemaking. The rulemaking agenda-what an agency
wishes to do and not to do, within the broad range of alternatives
available under its charter-is up to the agency itself. It is a large and
important area of political discretion.
Or at least it has been. Several developments suggest that this avenue
is more narrow than it used to be. The protection of rulemaking
discretion has rested largely upon the courts' practice of treating
agency nonaction differently from agency action. The Administrative
Procedure Act technically disavows any such distinction (see 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551(13), 704), but it has been the common law of judicial review.
There are some indications that the distinction is eroding. The District
of Columbia Circuit has specifically rejected the proposition that refusal to commence a rulemaking proceeding, or failure to adopt a rule,
is agency action "committed to agency discretion by law," 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2), and thus not subject to judicial review. WWHT, Inc. v.
FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 818-19 (D.C. Cir. 1981); NaturalResources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Even if the distinction is maintained, however, it may be of significantly reduced value in the current era, when the direction in which
the agencies' political judgment points is that of deregulation. Obviously, that will often require not merely inaction (failure to initiate a
particular rulemaking, or failure to select a more restrictive manner of
regulation) but the affirmative step of revoking existing rules. Thus, if
the distinction between action and nonaction is made the only touchstone for the preservation of rulemaking discretion, the judgment
whether or not to pursue a particular area or manner of regulation
ceases to be a political judgment once regulation has been initially
imposed. This seems the conclusion embraced by the D.C. Circuit in its
recent decision concerning the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's requirement for passive restraints in automobiles. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. DOT, D.C. Cir. No. 81-2220 (June 1, 1982).
The Arbitrary or Capricious Test. The last substantial device for preservation of the agencies' scope of political judgment review, which
requires merely that the rule be "rational" on the basis of the justifications assigned by the agency. There are, of course, usually a number of
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possible "rational" dispositions, and the selection among them is often
made on the basis of that nonanalytic societal preference that I have
termed "political judgment." The courts make sure that the stated
justifications support the course selected; but they do not prescribe
whichjustifications (In fact, the D.C. Circuit has gone even beyond this,
to assert that the revocation of a rule requires stricter judicial scrutiny
than its initial adoption. Id., slip op. at 47-50; NAACPv. FCC, No.
80-2416 (D.C. Cir. June 29, 1982), slip op. at 7.) must be used, and
hence do not closely control the ultimate selection. When, for example,
the FCC determined that thejustification of predictability and stability
warranted exempting existing licensees from its new ban on crossownership of newspapers and broadcast media in the same market (a
political judgment if there ever was one), the Supreme Court held that
an appellate court could not demand that the competing justification of
diverse information sources be given controlling weight and the exemption be eliminated. FCC v. National Citizens Ctee. for Broadcasting,
436 U.S. 775 (1978).
There are increasing signs of a break-down in this last device for
preserving scope of political judgment. More and more statutes abandon the "arbitrary or capricious" test entirely, and establish a stricter
(and politically more constraining) "substantial evidence" standard of
review. Even the "arbitrary or capricious" test itself is evolving towards
greater rigidity, in the courts of appeals at least, as the "rationality" test
finds itself supplemented by the fundamentally incompatible "hard
look" doctrine. What may turn out to be a major new impetus in the
same direction is, ironically enough, the handiwork of those who
currently have the most to lose from restricting the agencies' political
judgment-the deregulators. Executive Order 12291 and S. 1080, the
regulatory reform bill passed by the Senate, require that each agency
rule represent the "least burdensome alternative" for the achievement
of its objectives, and that it be accompanied by a cost-benefit analysis.
Those requirements certainly represent sound administration. And
properly understood (so that "burdens," "costs" and "benefits" include
not just purely economic elements but also unquantifiable values such
as aesthetic preferences, freedom from personal restraint, etc.) they
are probably a fair description of what "nonarbitrary" action requires
anyway. Moreover, neither the Executive Order nor the legislation
invites the courts to enforce these requirements, but to the contrary
explicitly make them unreviewable. The fact is, however, that these
requirements foster a view of rulemaking as a more or less mechanical,
value-free, nonpolitical exercise. And despite the exclusion of judicial
review,judges do not think and write in another world. What comes to
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be regarded, within the Executive and the Congress, as a requirement
of sound administration will ultimately be reflected in the judicial
application of the "arbitrary or capricious" standard as well.
Before leaving the subject of the devices that have insulated the
agencies' political judgments from judicial scrutiny, I might note my
suspicion that we have yet to feel the full impact of their elimination in
producing a conflict between what is expected of the agencies by the
political system and what is demanded of them by the courts. In the
decade when all of these protective doctrines were gutted, the consumer and environmental movements-unusual alliances of individuals with interests so diffuse and remote that they would ordinarily
not be politically effective-were in full flower. Their influence caused
the agencies' political judgments to be less dominated by the more
traditional and enduring interest groups, and to be more "rational" as
judges are given to see rationality. (This is not meant to suggest that the
policies supported by the consumer and environmental movements
are analytically superior, but only thatjudges-like most of the nonentrepreneurial upper-middle class to which they belong-are prone to
think so.) Should those unusual political alliances fade, as they seem to
be doing, and their influence before the agencies decline, the divergence between the agencies' political judgments and the courts' analytic ones will be magnified, and the old protections of ripeness, standing, rulemaking discretion and limited scope of review will be more
keenly missed.
Politically Insensitive Procedures. For the agencies to produce politically sound rules, it is not enough that the standard of review leave
room for political judgment. The rulemaking process itself must permit the play of political forces that enables an intelligent political
judgment to be formed. Here also we have seen debilitating change.
The sine qua non of political accommodation, confidential negotiation,
has been progressively eliminated. Most advisory committees have
been abolished, and those that remain have been turned into public
discussion groups through the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5
U.S.C. app. Even confidential discussions among the members of the
agency itself have been prohibited by the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552b. A panel decision of the D.C. Circuit has held all ex parte
contacts in rulemaking to be prohibited, Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,
567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Though contradicted by a decision of
another panel of the same court, A ctionfor Children'sTelevision v. FCC,
564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977), it has induced some agencies voluntarily
to abandon the practice. Or perhaps merely the zeitgeist has induced
them to do so-for the smoke-filled room is certainly (if you will
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pardon the pun) in bad odor. Congress itself has imposed rulemaking
requirements upon some agencies that come close to specifying a
closed "record" of the sort once reserved for adjudication. And it has
specifically required ex parte contacts with high-level officials of the
Federal Trade Commission to be made public. Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94
Stat. 379-80 (May 28, 1980), 15 U.S.C. 57a(j)(2).
The result of such limitations is that even when the applicable
standard of judicial review leaves room for political judgment, the
agency does not have the ability to make thatjudgment intelligently. It
is perhaps no coincidence that the agency whose rulemaking in recent
years has been most politically inept, has aroused most opposition in
Congress, has been most "unresponsive" to the popular will (as that will
is expressed through our political institutions) is the Federal Trade
Commission. Congressional overruling of FTC rules has occurred
under the tenure of regulation-oriented Chairman Michael Pertschuk
and deregulation-oriented Chairman James Miller alike. The FTC
happens to be the agency in which thejudicialization of the rulemaking
process (including elimination of high-level ex parte contacts) has been
most pronounced.

Lest I be misunderstood, I am not suggesting that all rulemaking is
appropriate for political judgment. There are, surely, instances in
which Congress has given an agency a technocratic mandate that
should be executed technocratically. For example, there is no room for
political accommodation or the application of unanalytic value judgment in the Food and Drug Administration's implementation of the
Delaney Amendment, which requires the banning of food additives
that have been shown to cause cancer in animals. But when the Federal
Trade Commission is told to prohibit "unfair or deceptive trade practices," or the Federal Communications Commission to manage the
airwaves "in the public interest, convenience and necessity"-that is
another matter. What such broad delegation precisely seeks is the
conferral of nontechnocratic, political judgments upon the agencies.
That may be good or bad; it may even, in the view of some, be
unconstitutional. But if it is to work, if the modern complaint of the
"unresponsive" bureaucracy is not to become a permanent feature of
our system, the scheme of judicial review and the requirements of
administrative process must permit political judgments to be made
politically.
The real problem, of course, is to sort out those agencies that are
supposed to be political (in the sense I have discussed) and those that
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are not-or more precisely those functions of each agency that are
supposed to be political and those that are not. We have made little
progress in that regard. Indeed, as the above comments suggest, the
whole trend in recent years has been simply (and somewhat moralistically) to deny the political component of agency action. There may be
some signs of change. The Administrative Conference, for example,
recently adopted a recommendation entitled "Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations," which envisions pre-rulemaking "regulatory negotiation" between the agency and interested parties concerning the text of a proposed rule. ACUS Recommendation 82-4, 47
Fed. Reg. 30,708 (July 15, 1982). It is a giant step backward in time and
forward in intelligence.
More needs to be done to bring the political, accommodationist,
value-judgment aspect of rulemaking out of the closet. When NHTSA
comes to reconsider the passive-restraint rule recently remanded by
the D.C. Circuit, and if it chooses to adhere to its prior course, it would
be refreshing and instructive if, instead of (or at least in addition to)
blowing smoke in our eyes with exhaustive technical and economic
data, it said flat-out: "It is our judgment that people should not be
strapped in cars if they don't want to be; nor should they have to spend
substantial sums for air-bags if they choose otherwise." A political
judgment, the retribution or reward for which will be meted out by
Congress, or at the polls, but not in the courts.
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